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Abstract 
This article contributes to the growing literature on extremist and terrorist online ecologies and 
approaches to snapshotting these. It opens by measuring Twitter’s differential disruption of so-called 
“Islamic State” versus other jihadi parties to the Syria conflict, showing that while Twitter became 
increasingly inhospitable to IS in 2017 and 2018, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham retained strong 
communities on the platform during the same period. An analysis of the same groups’ Twitter out-linking 
activity has the twofold purpose of determining the reach of groups’ content by quantifying the number of 




This article provides a snapshot of the 2017- 2018 Syrian jihadi online ecology that builds upon 
previous research conducted by the authors,1 a key finding of which was that jihadis on Twitter 
were subject to differing levels of disruption (i.e. account and content takedown). In particular, 
our “Disrupting Daesh” article underlined that pro- (so-called) “Islamic State” (IS) accounts were 
subject to far greater levels of disruption, as compared to a bucket of what we termed “Other 
Jihadi” accounts, including those affiliated with and/or supportive of Hay’ at Tahrir al-Sham 
(HTS), Ahrar al-sham (AAS), the Taliban, and al-Shabaab.2 Also addressed in that article was the 
out-linking patterns of users associated with the aforementioned groups, where prominent social 
media and content hosting platforms, including Facebook, YouTube, Google Drive, and a range of 
generally lesser known platforms, including archive.org, JustPasteIt and Telegram, were visible.3 
We thus emphasized the need to evolve existing research practices in this domain. Specifically, 
we noted the way in which researchers, counterterrorism professionals, policymakers, 
journalists, representatives of social media companies, and others focused on examining the 
intersections of terrorism and the Internet narrowed their focus, almost exclusively, to IS after 
they declared their so-called “caliphate” at the end of June 2014. In fact, many scholars in the field 
narrowed their focus even further to IS’s Twitter activity. We recommended against continued 
analytical contraction of this sort and pointed to the need to maintain a wide-angle view of online 
activity by a diverse range of jihadis, and other violent extremists and terrorists, across a variety 
of social media and other online platforms.4 
Having said this, the value of Twitter to jihadist groups, including IS, should not be 
underestimated. IS’s supporters, including on Dark Web forums and elsewhere, have been 
implored to return to the platform, with a representative post stating “[w]e call upon you 
[supporters] day and night to return to Twitter”.5 A wide range of “tricks and tips” have been 
circulated online by pro-IS users to seek to make this happen, including advice to pro-IS Twitter 
users on altering the terminology they use on the platform to avoid detection. Instructions are 
also routinely provided on IS and their supporters’ Telegram channels on possibilities for 
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avoiding contravention of Twitter’s Terms of Service (ToS).6 A portion of the current article 
therefore remains dedicated to Syrian jihadi groups’ Twitter activity, providing an accounting of 
Twitter’s disruption of not just pro-IS accounts, but accounts supportive of other jihadi parties to 
the Syria conflict, including whether differential disruption continued to be observed. It 
demonstrates that the differential disruption issue is an important one; due to the shifting 
fortunes of, in particular, IS and HTS on the ground in Iraq and Syria (and more widely). In the 
face of IS’s loss of their core physical territory, the continued—and potentially increasing—
importance of online “territory” should not be underestimated. The suggestion in this article is 
not therefore that a focus on IS and their online activity should be dispensed with, but that if 
HTS— along with other Syrian jihadi factions—are significantly less-impeded online, then this 
differential disruption will most likely be an important asset for them and worth monitoring. This 
quite narrow comparison of the differential disruption of IS versus HTS versus AAS can also feed 
into larger discussions around internet companies content moderation practices, especially 
around what Facebook terms “dangerous organizations”,7 and the reasoning behind and impacts 
of these.8 
One of these impacts has been the forced migration of especially IS to other online platforms and 
spaces, which adaptive behavior affects the overall complexion and structuring of the Syrian 
jihadi online ecology. There is a particular focus herein on Syrian jihadi groups’ Twitter out-
linking patterns. This includes quantifying the numbers of platforms being out-linked to, and 
describing and analyzing the types and purposes of these in order to provide a snapshot of the 
wider Syrian jihadi online ecology. Out-link analyses are a useful tool for broadening 
contemporary research on violent extremism, terrorism, and the Internet beyond social media to 
the variety of other online spaces in use by violent extremists and terrorists, and their online 
supporters. These include some groups’ heavy reliance on content upload sites, along with 
patterns of out-linking to more mainstream (i.e. nonextremist) websites, including mainstream 
news media sites. By considering these other online spaces and their structures and functions, 
this article contributes to the growing literature on extremist and terrorist online ecologies and 
approaches to snapshotting these. 
The article is composed of five sections. The first section addresses terminology, specifically our 
use of the terms “ecology” and “snapshotting”. Section two describes our methodology, including 
case selection and the social media monitoring techniques employed by us. Our findings are 
described in sections three and four, which address differential disruption and its impacts on 
groups’ online community strength and the nature and workings of the wider jihadi online 
ecology respectively. Our conclusion has an emphasis on directions for future research. 
 
Terminology 
Media ecology has a long history in media and communication studies, dating to at least the early 
1970s,9 but was first deployed in the study of online radicalization and terrorism by Awan, 
Hoskins and O’Loughlin in their 2011 book Radicalization and the Media: Connectivity and 
Terrorism in the New Media Ecology.10 There they drew attention to the way in which:  
The new media ecology is dependent first and foremost on the classification, circulation and 
organisation of ‘information’, which together forge an ‘information infrastructure’…[T]his 
infrastructure involves an increasing convergence of “standards, categories, technologies, and 
phenomenology.”11 In terms of radicalisation, the information infrastructure affords not just a 
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framework through which actors, institutions, and the practices of these groups and the 
relationships between them can be mapped out, but rather a more dynamic configuration of the 
nodes and networks ushered in through the connective turn” [our italics] (124). 
Subsequent analyses by online extremism and terrorism researchers appear—because 
none actually discuss the conceptual underpinnings of the terms they use—to adopt a more basic 
biological approach, in the sense of a focus on ecology revolving around the relationship between 
the environment and living organisms and on ecosystems revolving around the study of specific 
places and environments. In this approach, ecosystems are components of broader ecologies. So, 
for example, Clifford and Powell focus on the “Islamic State ecosystem on Telegram” whereas 
Macdonald et al. level-up with their focus on “Daesh, Twitter and the Social Media Ecosystem”.12 
In this article and in previous work, we utilize the concept of the “jihadi online ecology” to point 
to our interest in the quantity, distribution, and nature of online platforms and spaces (i.e. 
ecosystems) inhabited by jihadis and the interplay of these, as impacted by sociotechnical forces 
(i.e. their environment).13 
Like Awan, Hoskins and O’Loughlin we are skeptical of the ability of the terms “map” or “mapping” 
to capture the “dynamic configuration” of contemporary online ecologies; we prefer to use the 
term “snapshot” or “snapshotting” to refer to our findings. This is to underline (i) their 
ephemerality, given the fast-changing nature of both cyberspace and the groups active within it, 
(ii) the effectiveness of multiple iterations of the same or similar research to successfully capture 
the latter, and (iii) the utility of investigating complex online ecologies from a collage of different 




In addition to IS (which was the major focus of our previous research), we selected HTS and AAS 
for analysis herein for three primary reasons. Firstly, accounts either directly associated with 
them and/or their representatives or accounts supportive of them were some of the most active 
in our previous analysis. Secondly, similarly to IS, HTS has an international terrorism footprint 
and may pose a threat to Western publics again in the future;14 AAS occupies a more complex 
position however. At the time the research reported herein was undertaken (i.e. Nov. 2017 to 
March 2018), Syria, Russia, Iran, Egypt, and the UAE had each designated AAS as a terrorist 
organization, whilst together, the U.S., Britain, France, and Ukraine blocked a May 2016 Russian 
proposal to the United Nations to take a similar step. All three groups nonetheless share, to a 
greater or lesser extent, a commitment to violent jihadi ideology and have witnessed significant 
crossover of personnel. Third, these three groups have been major players in the Syria conflict. IS 
was once the largest and most powerful jihadi group in Syria; HTS continues in its role as “the 
largest non-ISIS extremist group in Syria”,15 and AAS is likely the second largest such group. Once 
described as “the best-armed and organized militant group in Syria after IS and the Nusra 
Front”,16 in February 2018 AAS amalgamated into the newly established Jabhat Tahrir Suriya 
(JTS) or Syrian Liberation Front, in which its leaders remain dominant however.17 The group 
nevertheless continues to be referred to as Ahrar al-Sham (AAS) in this article given that was its 
designation during most of the data collection period. 
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Taken together, analysis of IS, HTS, and AAS’s online activity supplied us with a detailed snapshot 
of the Syrian jihadi online ecology in the period November 2017 to March 2018. 
 
Social Media Monitoring Techniques 
The data collection for this project relied upon a combination of direct manual collection and a 
semi-automated methodology18 for identifying pro-jihadi accounts on Twitter; a methodology 
first deployed in our prior research.19 The overall approach was, therefore, a combination of 
automated and manual, and snowball and purposive sampling methods. Figure 1 illustrates this 
approach. 
Figure 1. Detailed flow diagram for semi-automated social media analysis. 
 
Candidate accounts were identified through finding those accounts that were related to other 
known accounts of interest (“seed accounts”), or tweets that contained specific terms (“seed 
search terms”). When a tweet matched these search criteria, further historic tweets were 
extracted for the candidate account and analyzed to see what proportion were topically relevant, 
using a machine-learning classifier trained to mimic the classification decisions of a human 
analyst. Tweets were also assessed for geographic focus, language used, and whether they 
contained known relevant jihadi terminology and/or iconography and symbols.20 This aggregate 
view of the tweet history of accounts was scored automatically and accounts that exceeded set 
thresholds were presented to a human analyst for categorization. Using a human analyst for 
review and categorization ensured that each decision was transparent and understandable, with 
consistent human level accuracy.21 Amongst other things, typical jihadi supporter accounts 
published tweets, retweeted, and “liked” tweets that supported specific groups’ ideology, 
operations, and leadership; followed a considerable number of other supporters of the same 
jihadi group and were followed-back by a considerable number of those supporters; and had a 
profile picture and/or marquee image that supported the group; or some intersection of these 
considerations. If the analyst confirmed an account was supportive of one of the three jihadi 




groups in our study, any out-links found in the account’s tweets were then extracted and 
analyzed. Information from new confirmed accounts was used by the system in a feedback loop 
to identify new seed search terms and provide additional seed accounts. 
We also reviewed any previously unidentified accounts that were following confirmed jihadi 
group supporters.22 Specifically, we looked for accounts that had embedded themselves within 
the network by following at least 15 accounts identified as supportive of one of the three jihadi 
groups we focused upon.23 Accounts that fulfilled this criterion were presented to an analyst for 
manual assessment (semi-automated collection) and then included in the analysis if confirmed as 
group supporters.  
Around 8% of accounts were highly connected to both HTS and AAS networks making automatic 
assignment on this basis to just one group uncertain.24 However, on examining our manual 
sample we found that a simple comparison of relative strength of those two relationships (with a 
suitable threshold) allowed for accurate delineation between HTS and AAS supporter accounts. 
Overall, using this approach, there was agreement in 90% of cases between the manual 
assignment and automatic assignments. 
 
Caveats 
There are a number of caveats attaching to this data collection process: 
• Not all the available data was captured. There were various periods of downtime for the 
semi-automated system throughout the data collection period as the methodology was 
developed and modified; 
• A number of (possibly largely pro-IS) accounts, found through the automated process, 
were unable to be included due to them being taken down before the system was able to 
gather a sufficient number of tweets to allow the human analyst to confirm their 
affiliation;  
• A large number of IS accounts (and a small number of HTS and AAS accounts) were first 
flagged because they had been suspended. They were subsequently manually assessed 
and confirmed (or otherwise) from an analysis of the content of the accounts’ tweets. 
 
Data 
The full and final research dataset comprised 1,236 pro-IS, 1,179 pro-HTS, and 3,782 pro-AAS 
accounts that were active on Twitter during some or all of the 4-month period between mid-
November 2017 and mid-March, 2018 (see Table 1). 
Due to the severe disruption of IS by Twitter, the pro-IS dataset contained no official accounts. In 
fact, official IS accounts were aggressively suspended by Twitter from summer 2014 onward.25 
The IS dataset was therefore composed largely of “throwaway” accounts. These were specifically 
created for the purpose of distributing propaganda, not associated with an individual user, 
generally had no followers, and not intended to be part of an identifiable community, but created 
only with the expectation that the account would be taken down within a very short period of 




Table 1. Description of Final Dataset(s) 
 IS HTS AAS Total 
Number of Accounts 1,236 1,179 3,782 6,197 
- of which manually confirmed 1,236 853 1,034 3,123 
- of which Network members ----- 326 2,748 3,074 
Method of Collection for Manually-confirmed Accounts 
- manual collection 33 410 295 738 
- semi-automated collection 1,203 443 739 2,385 
 
HTS were also circumspect in regards to establishing official accounts or identifying users as 
official spokespeople or officially associated with the group in some other function. The HTS 
dataset was, thus, largely composed of “fan” or supporter accounts. The latter type of accounts 
was defined as supportive of a particular group if their profile picture, marquee image, or bio 
contained imagery and/or text explicitly associated with that group, and/or they had at least one 
recent tweet by the user (i.e. not a retweet) that contained images and/or text explicitly 
supporting the group. Examples included referring to fighters as أبطال (i.e. abtaal or heroes),  أسود 
or آساد (i.e. usood or aasaad, both of which refer to lions), فرسان (i.e. fursan or knights), االخوة (al 
ikhwah or “the brothers”). The AAS dataset, on the other hand, contained a mixture of the group’s 
official accounts, accounts of their official representatives, semiofficial accounts, and “fan” or 
supporter accounts. Included, for example, was the “Official Account of Ahrar Al-Sham 
Movement” (i.e. @AhrarAl_Sham), which was active at the time of data collection and remained 
active on 1 June 2019, some 14 months later, with some 40.2K followers, but was later suspended 
by Twitter. Also included were accounts maintained by AAS’s Hasan Soufan (i.e. 
@hasan0soufan),27 then described in his account bio as “Leader of JTS and General Commander 
of Ahrar Al Sham Islamic Movement”, and Omar Khattab (i.e. @omar_khattab4),28 described in 
his bio as “Military Spokesman for Ahrar Al-Sham Movement”, but whose account has since been 
suspended. 
Observable for all groups, particularly IS, were users plainly skirting close to, but not 
contravening Twitter’s Terms of Service, in order to avoid account suspension. Advice on how to 
accomplish this has been provided to IS supporters on other online platforms, including 
Telegram.29 All such implicitly supportive accounts were excluded from our dataset(s). 
 
Differential Disruption 
The findings reported within this section are consistent with observations made in our previous 
research.30 Here it is demonstrated that the disruption to pro-IS accounts on Twitter was 
sufficiently severe to prevent the formation of a viable community, but that IS activated a large 
number of "throwaway" accounts on the platform for propaganda distribution purposes, a small 
proportion of which were not taken down immediately. Observations also suggested that while 
AAS supporters were subjected to minimal disruption on Twitter, a higher proportion of HTS 
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supporters suffered disruption to their activities; however, this interference was not sufficiently 
grave to prevent the latter forming a viable Twitter community. 
Of the 1,236 IS supporter accounts that were observed during the study period of January 2017 
to March 2018, under 6% (69) remained un-suspended at the end of the period—a far higher 
attrition rate than for the other groups (Table 2). Those that remained online had a median age 
of 351 days (interquartile range 957 days, or 2 years 7 months), a similar profile to HTS accounts. 
The research tracked the age at suspension of only 413 out of 1,167 accounts suspended (35% of 
the sample) and these accounts had a median age of 18 days (interquartile range 59 days). Unlike 
the other groups, the vast majority of identified pro-IS accounts were suspended within the time 
period of the study and results are consistent with the findings in previous research that (i) there 
is sufficient disruption to ensure a pro-IS community on Twitter is unable to form, but (ii) there 
continues to be ongoing efforts by IS supporters to distribute propaganda on Twitter using 
throwaway accounts, met by continuous efforts to disrupt that process.31 
Table 2. Level of Disruption Per Group 
 AAS HTS IS 
Percentage of categorised accounts suspended during the study 
(%) 7% 23% 94% 
Median age of un-suspended accounts (days) 752 369 351 
Median age of suspended accounts (days) 360 72 18 
 
Disruption of HTS supporters was considerably lower than for IS supporters. Focusing on the 
subset of accounts that were categorized manually during the study, of the 853 pro-HTS accounts, 
77% remained un-suspended at the end of the period. The median age of these un-suspended 
accounts was 369 days (1 year 0 months), higher than for pro-IS accounts, but significantly lower 
than for AAS. The interquartile range was likewise smaller at 749 days (2 years 1 month). The age 
of suspension was tracked for most accounts (159/194   ̶  82% of sample), outlining a short 
median lifespan of 72 days (under 3 months) and an interquartile range of 275 days (9 months). 
Most of the suspended HTS accounts tweeted content that violated Twitter’s ToS, such as 
videos/photos containing scenes of violence; tweets explicitly expressing support for HTS and its 
leadership; and tweets berating other jihadi groups such as AAS and Haraka Nour al-Din al-
Zinki,32 amongst others, including issuing threats toward their supporters. Some accounts also 
appeared to be suspended due to getting into debates with pro-AAS accounts, with some perhaps 
being reported by their opponents. Overall, HTS supporter accounts survived for a somewhat 
shorter period than AAS supporters and a higher proportion were shut down within a few 
months. However, the level of disruption was low enough for HTS supporters to maintain a viable 
Twitter community.  
Of the 1,034 manually identified AAS accounts active during the study time period, 964 (93%) 
remained online at the end of the period. The median age of these un-suspended accounts was 
752 days (2 years 1 month) with an inter-quartile range of 1,053 days (2 years 11 months). In 
total, the research tracked the age on suspension of 58 out of the 70 AAS accounts that were 
suspended (83% of the sample) and found a median age of 360 days at the time of their 
suspension (638 day inter-quartile range). In a similar way to the suspended HTS accounts, most 
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of the suspended AAS accounts also tweeted content that violated Twitter’s ToS. This included 
tweeting or retweeting violent content including, for example, images posted by HTS and other 
jihadi groups showing dead Syrian Arab Army (SAA), Kurdish (YPG), or IS fighters. In addition, a 
number of pro-AAS accounts were shut down after opponents reported them to Twitter, but with 
some restored later. It is worth noting here that offensive strategic reporting by groups’ 
supporters of their opponents’ accounts is not new nor restricted to Twitter, but observable 
across a variety of platforms including, for example, Telegram, up to time of writing.   
Overall, in the period studied, Twitter’s disruption efforts remained heavily tilted toward IS 
supporters. Of the accounts that were observed being suspended during the study, 81% of those 
that we manually categorized were found to be linked to IS. A further 14% were HTS accounts, 
and only 5% AAS accounts. Differential disruption thus continued to be an important feature of 
the Syrian jihadi Twitter ecosystem. 
 
Wider Syrian Jihadi Online Ecology 
Twitter, due partly to its 280 characters per tweet limit (i.e. micro-blogging function), can serve 
as a “gateway” platform to other social networking sites and a variety of other online spaces; in 
effect, in this case, the wider Syrian jihadi online ecology. This section addresses the Twitter out-
linking patterns of IS, HTS, and AAS supporters, with a particular focus on the types and purposes 
of the platforms being out-linked to from each and the implications of this. The analysis in this 
section relies upon a sub-sample of data from the overall dataset(s), comprising data from the 
manually inspected accounts associated with IS, HTS, and AAS, that were added either by a human 
analyst or through the semi-automated process described in the methodology section (see Table 
3; see also Table 1).  
Table 3. Summary Network Statistics for Automatically Induced Network Communities  
IS HTS AAS Total 
No. of Accounts 1,216 764 959 2,939 
No. of Tweets 49,251 157,107 180,493 386,851 
No. of Out-links 5,371 12,469 15,811 33,651 
% of Tweets Containing Out-
links* 10.9% 7.9% 8.8% 8.7% 
Intra-Twitter Links versus Out-Links 
The external (URL) links in a Twitter dataset comprise two types: out-links to other external URLs 
(web addresses), and intra-Twitter links to a Twitter URL. An intra-Twitter link, which is a direct 
pointer placed within a tweet to another tweet, is created whenever someone uses the “Quote 
Tweet” function in their message. The use of the “Quote Tweet” function is now popular across 
the global Twitter community and is likewise commonly seen in these datasets. Of all the links 
observed in the dataset, a substantial proportion was intra-Twitter links: 3,646 or 40.4% of pro-
IS, 8,612 or 40.9% of pro-HTS, 8,821 or 35.8% of pro-AAS links. Both out-links and intra-Twitter 
links operate in a similar fashion: by clicking on the link the user is taken to another location 
(where they might see new content or in turn be directed to another space). However, the latter 
do not, in themselves, take users outside the “Twitter universe” – thus, these have been omitted 
from this analysis of the use of Twitter as a gateway to other platforms.33 
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Preferred Other Online Platforms: Overview 
URLs contained in tweets that navigate users away from Twitter are known as out-links. There is 
a concentration here on the core, or top-level domains, identified in the URLs, so not the content 
of out-links per se, but instead the platforms out-linked to. This was accomplished by 
automatically extracting all out-links from the accounts of interest and storing them in the 
research database. From there, relevant top-level domain information from each out-link was 
extracted, discarding the individual link information. For example, all links to British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) content (e.g. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
41945189) were recorded as “BBC” for out-link analysis purposes. In addition, certain domains 
were aggregated, where appropriate, into a single category. For example, “www.facebook.com” 
and “web.facebook.com” were both categorized as “facebook”. 
The total number of discrete top-level domains identified across the three groups (i.e. IS, HTS, 
AAS) was over 2,200. The top out-links from each group was dominated by a relatively small 
number of platforms, with each then displaying a very long “tail” of social media platforms, 
websites, and other online spaces that were linked to only once or twice. Table 4 demonstrates 
the number of out-links for each of the three groups. The table has, however, been organized to 
represent (a) the Top 30 most out-linked to platforms/sites and (b) the remainder of the out-
links. The latter has been labeled as the “tail” due to the number of times each platform/site is 
represented dramatically reducing, where, toward the end of the tail, it represents merely one or 
two “hits”. The long tail, thus, has much fewer out-links, as compared to the Top 30, even though 
they represent a much greater number of platforms/sites. A standard power-law probability 
distribution was apprehensible here, in other words. 
Table 4. Number of Links to Top 30 Out-linked to Platforms Versus Number of Links in 
Long Tail of Other Platforms/Sites Out-linked To 
 Pro-IS Pro-HTS Pro-AAS 
Out-links No. % No. % No. % 
Top 30 Out-linked Platforms/Sites 3,661 80.7% 9,290 84.8% 13,522 90.6% 
Tail 1,710 19.3% 3,179 15.2% 2,289 9.4% 
TOTAL 5,371 100% 12,469 100% 15,811 100% 
 
The remainder of this section focuses on IS, HTS, and AAS’s Top 30 most out-linked to 
platforms/sites (see Table 5), as this covers a minimum of 80% of all out-links distributed by each 
group. Each of these Top 30 most out-linked to platforms/sites were manually categorized 
according to a bespoke coding scheme developed for the project. This scheme focused upon the 
Type, Purpose, and, if relevant, Sub-type of each online space out-linked to. The five Types of 
spaces identified were Social Media, Website, Messaging/Telephony, Content Hosting, and 
Other.34 As represented in Table 6, the overall jihadi online ecology was heavily dominated by 
social media platforms, but with traditional websites playing a not insignificant role. 
Messaging/Telephony and Content Hosting sites played negligible overall roles. Within the Top 





























587 youtube 2230 youtube 4,281 
2. youtube 454 du3a.org 1324 facebook 2,679 
3. archive.org 250 telegram 1249 telegram 2,148 
4. archive_obscure 243 facebook 1166 du3a.org 1,744 
5. justpaste 217 eldorar.com 751 d3waapp.org 514 
6. pc.cd 215 wikimapia.org 383 justpaste 306 
7. du3a.org 190 babalhawa.net 345 nedaa-sy.com 169 
8. reuters 148 d3waapp.org 305 aldorars.com 152 
9. play-sites-account-
news-google 
144 zad-muslim.com 203 ghared.com 148 
10. dropbox 121 aljazeera 135 instagram 141 
11. tune.pk 119 justpaste 119 aljazeera 109 
12. ok.ru 86 instagram 116 eldorar.com 96 
13. dailymotion.com 79 MedicalAidSyria 110 buff.ly 88 
14. telegram 74 aa.com 75 turkpress 85 
15. facebook 73 mepanews.com 73 7asnat.com 78 
16. cloud.mail.ru 70 pscp.tv 72 google-drive-
photos-image 
72 
17. twitlonger.com 62 alemara1.net 69 wikimapia.org 71 
18. wikimapia.org 59 ghared.com 59 pscp.tv 71 
19. trackingterrorism.org 54 soundcloud.com 57 zad-muslim.com 63 
20. aljazeera 49 guardian 46 fllwrs.com 61 
21. rt 48 whounfollowedme.org 46 aa.com 58 
22. streamable.com 45 ogn.news 44 shaam.org 57 
23. vimeo.com 41 rt 43 Quran.to 48 
24. sendvid.com 37 vimeo.com 42 syrianoor.net 46 
25. bbc 36 sn4h 40 yenisafak.com 42 
26. amazon.com 36 bbc 39 sn4h 41 
27. soundcloud.com 33 orient-news.net 39 rfsmediaoffice.com 41 
28. my.mail.ru 32 smartnews-
agency.com 
39 orient-news.net 38 
29. siteintelgroup 30 reuters 37 trtarabic.tv 38 
30. instagram 29 washingtonpost.com 34 secure.avaaz.org  
 
Social Media 
Given the dominance of the Social Media and Website Types, which together accounted for over 
80% of all out-links, these were disaggregated further according to their Purpose. For Social 
Media, these Purposes were Image Sharing, Live Streaming, Microblogging, Social Media Add-on, 
Social Networking, Sound Sharing, Video Sharing, and Wiki. Table 7 shows that the category Social 
Media Add-on just edged out Social Networking for the top overall Purpose for Social Media 
activity. This is a somewhat erroneous finding, which can be explained by a small number of users 
utilizing, predominantly religious, Social Media Add-on apps such as du3a.org, 3waapp.org, 
zadmuslim.com that automatically posted to users’ Twitter timelines. Such automated posts can 
account for upward of 24 links per day per user (i.e. one per user per hour) and generally take 
the form of religious edicts and prayers. Aside from religious commitment, another potential 
reason for overwhelming Twitter feeds with this type of content could be to try and “hide” 
extremist content, in order to avoid disruption. 
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Table 6. Types of Other Online Spaces Out-linked to By Jihadis From Twitter 
 Pro-IS Pro-HTS Pro-AAS TOTAL 
Type/Out-links No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Social Media 1,257 34.33 6,003 64.61 9909 73.28 17,169 64.85 
Website 365 9.96 1919 20.65 1009 7.46 3293 12.43 
Messaging/ 
Telephony 74 2.02 1249 13.44 2148 15.88 3471 13.11 
Content Hosting 1,606 43.86 119 1.28 378 2.79 2103 7.94 
Dead Link 215 5.87 ----- ----- 78 0.57 293 1.10 
Other 144 3.93 ----- ----- ------ ----- 144 0.54 
TOTAL 3,661 100 9290 100 13,522 100 26,473 100 
 
Table 7. Purpose of Other Social Media Platforms Out-linked to By Jihadis From Twitter 
 Pro-IS Pro-HTS Pro-AAS TOTAL 
Purpose/ 
Group 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Social Media 
Add-on 252 20.04 1,937 32.26 2,666 26.90 4,855 28.27 
Social 
Networking 191 15.19 1,166 19.42 2,679 27.03 4,036 23.50 
Video Sharing 693 55.13 2,272 37.84 4,281 43.20 7,246 42.20 
Wiki 59 4.69 383 6.38 71 0.71 513 2.98 
Image Sharing 29 2.30 116 1.93 141 1.42 286 1.66 
Live Streaming ----- ----- 72 1.19 71 0.71 143 0.83 
Sound Sharing 33 2.62 57 0.94 ----- ----- 90 0.52 
TOTAL 1,257 100% 6,003 100% 9,909 100% 17,169 100% 
 
Social Media Add-ons aside, the Social Media category was dominated by just two Purposes, Social 
Networking and Video Sharing. The Social Networking category included a variety of both high 
profile and less well known social media platforms, including Facebook, on the one hand, and 
Russia’s Odnoklassniki, on the other. The Video Sharing category presents similar findings, 
including both large (e.g. YouTube) and a variety of smaller (e.g. Dailymotion, Tune Pakistan) 
platforms. In both categories, however, it was the large and high-profile platforms that dominated 
12 
 




For the Website category, the identified Purposes were Activism, Entertainment, Fundraising, 
News, Other Politics/World Affairs, and Other. In terms of Purpose, News dominated the Website 
category, accounting for 62.5% of all entries. The News category was, therefore, further sub-typed 
into Agency/Wire, Multiple, Online Only, Press, Radio, and Television. This sub-category was 
dominated by outlets that operate solely online (“Online Only”). These Online Only sites 
represented 18 of the Top 30 most out-linked to platforms/sites for the three groups combined. 
This included the overall top-linked to News Website eldorar.com (849 links), which described 
itself in its Twitter bio—@dorarsite account since suspended—as a “Media project concerned 
with the Syria - Lebanon - Palestine – Jordan”. However, an analysis of the website showed that it 
to be a pro-Syrian opposition site publishing news from a “rebel perspective”, including 
statements from organizations such as AAS, HTS, Jaysh Al Islam, Nour al-Din al-Zinki, and a 
number of others. Having said this, a range of more traditional news media outlets were also 
represented in the Top 30. This included six television stations (including Al-Jazeera (367 links), 
the BBC (198 links), RT.com (140 links), and CNN (83 links)); four press agencies or news wires 
(including Reuters (261 links) and Turkey’s state-run Andalou Agency (160 links)); and three 
newspapers (The Guardian (132 links), the pan-Arab daily Al Quds Al Arabi (59 links), and the 
conservative Turkish daily Yeni S¸afak (54 links)). After News, the next most popular Website 
category, representing 21.4% of out-links, were dedicated websites maintained by a variety of 
extremist groups (e.g. Hizb ut-Tahrir, al-Shamiah Front) besides those three focused upon herein. 
 
Messaging/Telephony: Telegram 
Telegram is described on its website as “a messaging app with a focus on security and speed”.35 
In terms of Type therefore, it was included, for analysis purposes, in the Messaging/Telephony 
category and not, for example, Social Media.36 Telegram is worth commenting upon separately 
here because it is presently the most-preferred online platform of pro-IS users.37 This, however, 
was not evident in the analysis for this piece of research, as out-links to Telegram composed just 
1.3% of all pro-IS accounts’ Twitter out-links.38 This is in contrast to other parties to the Syria 
conflict: pro-HTS accounts in our dataset linked to Telegram 1,249 times, representing 10% of 
their total out-links, while AAS-related Twitter accounts shared 2,148 links to Telegram, 
composing almost 13.6% of their total out-links. 
 
Preferred Other Online Platforms by Group 
Pro-Islamic State Accounts 
There was significant variation in individual users out-linking practices, with some being very 
heavy out-linkers and others very much intra-Twitter. Pro-IS users displayed a pattern distinct 
from others, however, relying heavily on out-linking due to the nature of their accounts (i.e. 
throwaway) and the disruption they faced by Twitter. Overall, pro-IS accounts were far more 
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likely to tweet links to content hosting sites, than supporters of HTS or AAS, for example. This 
amounted to 43.9% of out-links from pro-IS users to Content Hosting sites, including in top place 
a variety of Google sites, such as Drive, Photos, etc., and a variety of other similar sites (including 
justpaste.it, archive.org, and Dropbox, for example). At least one reason for this heavy reliance on 
hosting sites, in the face of disruption by an increasing array of social media and other platforms, 
is for these sites to act as back-up “drives” that can be resorted to when content is deleted from 
higher profile online spaces. 
Increased reliance on content hosting sites due to disruption of pro-IS users and content by social 
media companies is detrimental to IS supporters’ public outreach activity. Most content upload 
sites are not searchable (either by, for instance, Google or internally), for example, and their 
content can therefore only be accessed by possession of dedicated URLs, which limits its wider 
availability. Many content upload sites also have no or only very rudimentary recommendation 
capabilities,39 in contrast to their social media counterparts. These are drawbacks from the 
perspective of engaging in wide online public outreach. 
Having said this, in addition to Content Hosting sites, Video Sharing platforms also featured 
prominently, with YouTube ranking second for overall out-links from pro-IS Twitter accounts, 
despite being under considerable pressure from policymakers to stepup the disruption of IS-
related activity on their platform. In fourteenth place, accounting for 119 out-links from pro-IS 
accounts, was the video sharing platform tune.pk, which is similar in nature to YouTube, but 
hosted in Pakistan. This platform was linked-to by an array of accounts, but most of which had a 
common characteristic, screen names and @handles constructed of random letters and numbers, 
indicating that they were set-up specifically to avoid disruption and potentially as “throwaway 
accounts”. Tune.pk provides an alternative to YouTube, with a simple search on the platform 
returning multiple pro-IS videos, some of which were extremely violent in nature. 
 
Pro-Hayat Tahrir Al Sham (HTS) Accounts 
Pro-HTS supporters out-links amounted to 12,469, representing 24.9% of all out-links in the 
overall dataset. The Top 30 out-linked-to sites for HTS were dominated by Websites (16/30) and 
Social Media platforms (12/30). When considering the numbers of out-links to these two 
different types of online spaces, however, the total number of Websites (1,885) was less than a 
third of those to Social Media platforms (6,003). The Video Sharing platform YouTube appeared 
in top position for pro-HTS users’ out-links, with some 2,230 hits. A substantial portion (35.1%) 
of other out-links in the Social Media category was accounted for by Social Media Add-ons, 
whereby users allowed applications to post religious messages, in the form of tweets, 
automatically to their timelines. The Website category, on the other hand, was dominated by 
News sites. Although major global news corporations, including the BBC and Reuters appeared, 
they did so lower down in Table 5 (i.e. at no. 27 and no. 30 respectively). The preferred news 
website for pro-HTS accounts was eldorar.com (described earlier) (751), which, despite their 






Pro-Ahrar Al Sham (AAS) Accounts 
Pro-AAS accounts had the highest rate of out-links, with 15,811, which accounted for 31.5% of 
the entire out-link sample across all three groups. Social Media dominated the pro-AAS out-links, 
with YouTube and Facebook the first and second most out-linked to platforms, respectively. 
Combined, these two accounted for 51.5% of the total outlinks for the Top 30 most out-linked to 
online spaces by pro-AAS Twitter accounts (Table 5). When broken down, YouTube was out-
linked to 4,281 and Facebook 2,679 times. The Messaging/Telephony application, Telegram came 
in at number three in the pro-AAS Top 30 most linked-to platforms, with a total of 2,148 out-links, 
representing 15.9% of the Top 30 sample. As with HTS, Social Media Add-ons of a religious nature, 
operating on the Twitter platform, also featured amongst pro-AAS users, but not as prominently. 
From fourth position onward the numbers of out-links drop precipitously, from 1,744 in fourth, 
to 514 in fifth, and to under 100 from 13th position onwards (Table 5). This indicates that while 
News websites featured strongly in the table—with AAS and supporters relying on news from 
both media corporations like Orient News and al-Jazeera, and from small-to-medium internet and 
media companies, including Turkpress and Syrian Noor—these did not account for very large 
numbers of out-links overall, especially as compared to Social Media platforms. 
 
Conclusion 
There has been a tendency with regard to the Syria conflict for academic and other researchers, 
along with media, policymakers, and social media companies, to focus predominantly upon IS’s 
online activity to the exclusion of the online activity of other parties to the conflict. In this article, 
we focused on not just IS, but a number of other Syria-based purveyors of violent jihadi ideology, 
namely HTS and AAS, and their online supporters. 
Considerable variation—what we term “differential disruption”—was observed as regards 
Twitter’s disruption of the three groups studied in 2017 and 2018. Unsurprisingly, pro-IS 
accounts were found to be the most highly pressured, with a disruption rate upwards of 94%. 
Pro-HTS accounts, even though they were the second most disrupted group, only had a disruption 
rate of some 23%, which gave them considerable ongoing traction on the Twitter platform. Pro-
Ahrar accounts were found to be even freer in their activity subject to levels of disruption of just 
7%. It appears that, in effect, Twitter’s disruption activity correlated with the perceived level of 
“real world” terrorism threat posed to the West by particular groups and their supporters. 
In terms of the wider Syrian jihadi online ecology, there was a focus upon the variety of platforms 
out-linked to from Twitter by pro-IS, pro-HTS, and pro-AAS accounts. Despite the overall number 
of discrete platforms and sites out-linked to being well over 2,000, this was heavily dominated by 
links to social media platforms, particularly major social media sites, including Facebook and 
YouTube.40 In addition, websites, particularly News websites, were also shown to be important 
nodes in the jihadi online ecology. These included not just local and regional outlets, whether 
professional or engaged in so-called “citizen journalism” activity, but also major global media 
corporations, such as al-Jazeera, the BBC, CNN, and RT. The role of news media in contemporary 
extremist and terrorist online ecologies has been largely overlooked to-date and, in fact, is 
probably under-estimated here given that a proportion of the content being circulated on the 




The most salient difference between the groups was pro-IS users’ outsized reliance on content 
hosting sites. This reflects the fact that, of the three groups studied, IS were and are presently 
under the most pressure, both in the “real world” and online. Pro-IS accounts are being 
significantly disrupted on major social media and other prominent online platforms and, outside 
of Telegram, they must rely on a variety of other, often quite obscure, platforms to diversify their 
online presence. HTS and AAS, on the other hand, have a relatively uninterrupted presence on a 
diversity of platforms, including major social media sites. 
 
Future Research 
We suggest that there are at least two major avenues of future research arising from this work. 
The first relates to out-link analysis and has at least two parts. Initially, a more granular 
categorization of the Top 30 most out-linked to platforms by each group from Twitter should be 
undertaken. This could include, but need not be limited to, addition of a Language category. 
Anecdotally, for example, in this analysis we encountered sites and/or content in Arabic, 
Bahasa/Indonesian, Bengali, English, Farsi, French, German, Pashto, Russian, Spanish, Turkish, 
and Urdu. An analysis of which groups were linking to content in what languages would provide 
useful additional insights about groups’ network members and target audience(s). The second 
issue arising from this research to pursue further is the long tail of platforms and sites out-linked 
to by the groups studied, but falling outside of the Top 30 lists focused upon here. The UN 
Counter-terrorism Directorate (UNCTD)-sponsored Tech Against Terrorism project is tasked 
with, amongst other things, supporting small and medium Internet companies in responding to 
the risks associated with hosting terrorism content on their platforms.41 One of the things that 
analysis of this sort does is draw attention to the rather large number of these that are currently 
hosting—admittedly small amounts on the basis of out-link counts—such content and what 
functionalities of these platforms are particularly salient to extremists and terrorists and their 
supporters at any given time. 
Second, the authors have consistently maintained that a narrow focus on IS and its supporters’ 
online activity is too reductionist. This is at least one of the reasons for the focus in this article on 
IS activity as a component of a wider Syrian jihadi online ecology, including—but certainly not 
limited to—HTS and AAS. There is no reason why such analyses should be restricted to violent 
jihadi online activity; this analysis could be usefully extended in various directions. The approach 
described herein could be used to more thoroughly analyze online activity in the Syria conflict 
more broadly by integrating data on other major parties to the conflict such as, for example, the 
online activity of non-jihadi opposition groups, the Assad government, and Shi’a militias. If a focus 
on militants and terrorists were to be maintained, a comparison of our findings with the online 
activity of other similar entities in the region (e.g. Hamas, Hizbollah, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization 
Units, Yemen’s Houthis) would be appropriate.  
Furthermore, a 2016 analysis of extreme right Twitter out-linking practices had similar findings 
to those contained in this article: 
YouTube was the top linked-to platform from Twitter in our exploratory analysis of all out-links 
from a sample of 175 European extreme right Twitter accounts. The next most prevalent links 
were to a selection of ideologically consistent news websites, including express.co.uk, 
dimissionietuttiacasa.com, breitbart.com, dailymail.co.uk, and rt.com. Similar to the pro-IS out-
links, traditional mass media outlets, particularly newspapers, were identified as prominent nodes 
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in the European extreme right online scene; blogs also remain conspicuous components of the 
same scene.42 
Similar results were reported by J.M. Berger in his Alt-Right Twitter census.43 A larger scale and 
more up-to-date analysis of the wider extreme right online ecology, not just in the U.S., but 
covering the U.K., and Western Europe more widely, could lead to useful insights as regards the 
similarities and differences between this and the jihadi online ecology, some of which are already 
apparent in the above quote. Nor is Twitter required to be the “gateway platform” for such 
research. Telegram would, for example, be an appropriate starting point for out-link analyses of 
either or both of contemporary jihadi and extreme right online ecologies. A project employing 





1 Maura Conway, Moign Khawaja, Suraj Lakhani, Jeremy Reffin, Andrew Robertson, and David Weir, 
“Disrupting Daesh: Measuring Takedown of Online Terrorist Material and Its Impacts,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 42, no. 1–2 (2018): 141–160. 
2 Ibid., 146–148 and 150–152. 
3 Ibid., 152–153. 
4 Ibid., 152 and 157; see also Maura Conway, “Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism 
and Terrorism: Six Suggestions for Progressing Research,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 1 (2017): 
85 and 88. 
5 Ken Wolf, “An Analysis of Islamic State Propaganda Distribution,” Flashpoint, 2018, 8, accessed May 18, 
2020, https://go.flashpoint-intel.com/docs/an-analysis-of-islamic-statepropaganda-distribution. 
6 Bennett Clifford, “‘Trucks, Knives, Bombs, Whatever’: Exploring Pro-Islamic State Instructional Material 
on Telegram,” CTC Sentinel 11, no. 5 (2018): 23–29. 
7 Facebook, “What Types of Organizations Aren’t Allowed on Facebook?”, Facebook Help, n.d., accessed May 
18, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/help/1738430046395200?helpref=related. 
8 Maura Conway, “Routing the Extreme Right: Challenges for Social Media Platforms,” RUSI Journal 165, no. 
1 (2020): 3. 
9 Casey Man Kong Lum, “Introduction: The Intellectual Roots of Media Ecology,” New Jersey Journal of 
Communication 8, no. 1 (2000): 1–7. 
10 Akil Awan, Andrew Hoskins, and Ben O’Loughlin, Radicalisation and the Media: Connectivity and 
Terrorism in the New Media Ecology (London and New York: Routledge, 2011). 
11 Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequences 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 47. 
12 Bennett Clifford and Helen Powell, “Encrypted Extremism: Inside the English-Speaking Islamic State 
Ecosystem on Telegram” (Washington, DC: GWU Program on Extremism, 2019), accessed May 18, 2020, 
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/EncryptedExtremism.pdf; Stuart Macdonald, 
Daniel Grinnell, Anina Kinzel, and Nuria Lorenzo-Dus, “Daesh, Twitter and the Social Media Ecosystem: A 
Study of Outlinks Contained in Tweets Mentioning Rumiyah,” RUSI Journal 164, no. 4 (2019): 60–72. See 
also Ali Fisher, Nico Prucha, and Emily Winterbotham, “Mapping the Jihadist Information Ecosystem: 
Towards the Next Generation of Disruption Capability” (RUSI, London: GNET, 2019), accessed May 18, 
2020, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20190716_grntt_paper_06.pdf; Niall F. Johnson, Minzhang 
Zheng, Yulia Vorobyeva, Andrew Gabriel, Hong Qi, Nicolás Velásquez, Pedro Manrique, Douglas Johnson, 
Elvira María Restrepo, and Chaoming Song. “New Online Ecology of Adversarial Aggregates: ISIS and 
Beyond,” Nature 
352, no. 6292 (2016): 1459–63. 




14 HTS has often been referred to as al-Qaeda’s Syria affiliate, but this is challenged by some analysts, who 
also view it as much more Syria- than global-focused; see, for example, Tore Refslund Hamming and Pieter 
Van Ostaeyen, “The True Story of al-Qaeda’s Demise and Resurgence in Syria,” Lawfare, April 8, 2018, 
accessed May 18, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/true-story-al-qaedas-demise-and-resurgence-
syria; and Charles Lister, “US Officials Just Mislabeled a Syrian Terror Group as al Qaeda. Worse, They’re 
Missing a Far Bigger Threat,” Defense One, June 1, 2018, accessed May 18, 2020, https://www.defenseone. 
com/ideas/2018/06/us-officials-just-mislabeled-syrian-group-al-qaeda-worse-theyre-missing-far- 
bigger-threat/148656/. It is worth noting here too that a new group composing al-Qaeda loyalists and 
known as Tandhim Hurras al-Deen—the “far bigger threat” referred to by Lister—was established at the 
end of February 2018 and it is this group that is now viewed by many as al-Qaeda’s de facto Syria branch. 
15 Syria Study Group, “Final Report and Recommendations” (Washington DC: USIP, 2019), 22, accessed May 
18, 2020, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Syria%20Study%20Group%20Final%20Report.pdf. 
16 Nusra Front is one of the former designations of HTS. Bassem Mroue, “One of Syria’s Most Powerful Rebel 
Groups is Rebranding itself with Turkey’s Backing,” Business Insider, October 8, 2015, accessed May 18, 
2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/ahrar-al-sham-insyria-and-turkey-2015-10?r=US&IR=T; see 
also CISAC, “Ahrar al-Sham,” (Mapping Militant Organisations: Stanford University, 2017), accessed May 
18, 2020, https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/523. 
17 Hamming and Van Ostaeyen, “The True Story of al-Qaeda’s Demise and Resurgence 
in Syria.” 
18 Implemented using the Method52 social media analysis platform; for more information on this, see 
www.taglaboratory.org. 
19 Conway et al. “Disrupting Daesh: Measuring Takedown of Online Terrorist Material and Its Impacts.” 
20 Our approach was very similar to that detailed in Valentine Crosset, Samuel Tanner, and Aurélie 
Campana, “Researching Far Right Groups on Twitter: Methodological Challenges 2.0,” New Media & Society 
21, no. 4 (2019): 939–61. 
21 For more, see Deven Parekh, Amarnath Amarasingam, Lorne Dawson and Derek Ruths, “Studying 
Jihadists on Social Media: A Critique of Data Collection Methodologies,” Perspectives on Terrorism 12, no. 3 
(2018): 3–21, in which our methodology is discussed and compared with others. See also Margeret Hall, 
Michael Logan, Gina S. Ligon, and Douglas C. Derrick, “Do Machines Replicate Humans? Toward a Unified 
Understanding of Radicalizing Content on the Open Social Web,” Policy & Internet 12, no. 1 (2020): 109–
138. 
22 Any Twitter account can choose to follow another account. 
23 Accounts that had more than 5,000 followers were also excluded in order to focus the analysis on ‘local’ 
inter-personal relations rather than on ‘celebrities’ or other types of high-profile accounts, which were 
followed by a wide range of interested parties (e.g. other parties to the conflict, journalists, researchers, 
etc.). 
24 These included accounts that regretted or condemned the infighting between HTS and Ahrar and urged 
unity in the fight against their common enemy (i.e. the Syrian regime); accounts that praised influential 
Islamic scholars (e.g. Saudi cleric Sheikh Abdullah Al Moheisany) who were trying to mediate between HTS 
and Ahrar; and accounts that were supportive of groups such as Jaish al-Izzah who refused to take sides 
and focused on 
attacking the regime. 
25 J. M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of 
ISIS Supporters on Twitter” (Washington DC: Brookings, 2015), 23, accessed May 18, 2020, 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/is,is_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf. 
26 Conway et al., “Disrupting Daesh: Measuring Takedown of Online Terrorist Material and Its Impacts,” 8–
9 and 16. 
27 This account was active at the time of data collection and remained active on 1 April 2020, showing 26.6K 
followers, but with no bio any longer appearing. Worth noting here too is that Jaber Ali Basha took over 




followers on 1 April 2020 and an Arabic language bio reading “General Commander of the Islamic 
Movement of Ahrar al-Sham.” 
28 Khattab’s account remained available on 1 June 2019, but with the most recent tweet from 4 February 
2018, and just 1,833 followers. 
29 Clifford, “‘Trucks, Knives, Bombs, Whatever’: Exploring Pro-Islamic State Instructional Material on 
Telegram.” 
30 Conway et al., “Disrupting Daesh: Measuring Takedown of Online Terrorist Material and Its Impacts,” 6–
7 and 12. 
31 Conway et al., “Disrupting Daesh: Measuring Takedown of Online Terrorist Material and Its Impacts.” 
32 The Nour al-Din al-Zinki Movement was a Syrian Islamist group with previously close ties to, amongst 
others, HTS, which together with AAS coalesced into JTS in February 2018. 
33 It is worth noting that linking is not the only way in which tweet content can be augmented. Tweets can 
contain embedded images and videos (“mediaURLs”) which can be viewed directly within the tweet 
without the need to be directed to some other site or platform via a link. The use of embedded photos and 
(more rarely) videos is common practice. As with Twitter in-linking, embedding content does not take 
users outside Twitter and is therefore not considered further here.  
34 Worth acknowledging here is the difficulty of classifying some platforms that overlap our categories. For 
example, we classified YouTube as a Social Media platform with the purpose of Video Sharing rather than 
a Content Hosting site; conversely Samantha Weirman and Audrey Alexander in their “Research Note: 
Hyperlinked Sympathizers—URLs and the Islamic State” (Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 43, no. 3 (2020): 
239–57) categorise YouTube—along with justpaste.it, archive.org, vid.me, and soundcloud.com—as a file-
sharing “base domain” (ibid: 247). We based our classification decisions on a combination of the platforms’ 
selfdescriptions and the company descriptors supplied by Google Finance. Prominent on YouTube’s About 
page is its self-description as a place to “listen, share and build community;” Google Finance categorises 
YouTube as a “video sharing company.” 
35 See https://telegram.org/. 
36 Google Finance classifies Telegram as simply “software.” 
37 Mia Bloom, Hicham Tiflati, and John Horgan “Navigating ISIS’s Preferred Platform: Telegram,” Terrorism 
and Political Violence 31, no. 6 (2019): 1242–1254. See also Nick Robins-Early, “How Telegram Became the 
App of Choice For ISIS,” HuffPost, May 24, 2017, accessed May 19, 2020, 
https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/isis-telegram-
app_n_59259254e4b0ec129d3136d5?ri18n=true; Laura Smith, “Messaging App Telegram Centrepiece of 
IS Social Media Strategy,” BBC News, June 5, 2017, accessed May 18, 2020, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-39743252. 
38 This matches previous findings; see Conway et al. “Disrupting Daesh: Measuring Takedown of Online 
Terrorist Material and Its Impacts,” 13. 
39 Online recommender systems present content to users of specific platforms that they might not 
otherwise locate based on, for example, prior search or viewing history on that platform. See Derek 
O’Callaghan, Derek Greene, Maura Conway, Joe Carthy, and Pádraig Cunningham, “Down the (White) Rabbit 
Hole: The Extreme Right and Online Recommender Systems,” Social Science Computer Review 33, no. 4 
(2015): 559–78. 
40 Similar findings have been demonstrated in related research; see, for example, Weirman and Alexander 
“Research Note: Hyperlinked Sympathizers—URLs and the Islamic State”; Wolf, “An Analysis of Islamic 
State Propaganda Distribution”. 
41 For more, see https://www.techagainstterrorism.org. 
42 Maura Conway, “Violent Extremism and Terrorism Online In 2016: The Year in Review” (Dublin: VOX-
Pol, 2016), 11–12, accessed May 18, 2020, https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/Year-
In-Review-WEB.pdf. 
43 J. M. Berger, “The Alt-Right Twitter Census Defining and Describing the Audience for Alt Right Content 
on Twitter” (Dublin: VOX-Pol, 2018), accessed May 18, 2020, https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-
pol_publication/AltRightTwitterCensus.pdf. 
